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Abstract
Identifying eﬀects of actions (treatments) on
outcome variables from observational data
and causal assumptions is a fundamental
problem in causal inference. This identiﬁca-
tion is made diﬃcult by the presence of con-
founders which can be related to both treat-
ment and outcome variables. Confounders
are often handled, both in theory and in
practice, by adjusting for covariates, in other
words considering outcomes conditioned on
treatment and covariate values, weighed by
probability of observing those covariate val-
ues. In this paper, we give a complete graph-
ical criterion for covariate adjustment, which
we term the adjustment criterion, and derive
some interesting corollaries of the complete-
ness of this criterion.
1 Introduction
Estimating causal eﬀects in the presence of confound-
ing variables is an important problem in causal in-
ference. By causal eﬀect here we mean a probability
distribution on some set of outcomes after adminis-
tering treatment. Confounders are found among those
variables which are related to both treatment and out-
come. Pearl [7], [8] developed a system of inference
about such problems using the language of causal di-
agrams. Though complete rules for identiﬁcation of
causal eﬀects have been derived using this language [5],
[13], [12], [14] in practice the vast majority of causal ef-
fect identiﬁcation is done either via instrumental vari-
able methods, or by covariate adjustment. Pearl’s
back-door criterion [7] gives graphical conditions for
when covariate adjustment yields valid functionals for
the causal eﬀect. The back-door criterion, however, is
not complete ([8], chapter 11). In other words, there
exist causal diagrams where the back-door criterion
fails for some set of covariates, yet adjusting for that
set results in a valid functional for the causal eﬀect.
In this paper, we give a complete graphical criterion
for the validity of covariate adjustment as an identi-
ﬁcation method for causal eﬀects, which we term the
adjustment criterion. We further give some interesting
corollaries of the completeness of our criterion.
2 Preliminaries
Causal diagrams [7], [8] are directed acyclic graphs
representing probabilistic causal domains. Nodes in
causal diagrams represent variables of interest while
arrows represent direct causal inﬂuences. Causal di-
agrams are associated with structural causal models
(SCMs) deﬁned in [8], chapter 7. SCMs consist of a
set of observed variables V and unobserved or latent
variables {U1,...,Uk} = U. Without loss of general-
ity, it is usually assumed that the unobserved vari-
ables are exogenous and drawn from a distribution
P(u) =
Q
i P(ui), and the observed variables are en-
dogenous, whose values are obtained from the val-
ues of other variables by means of determining func-
tions. The distribution P(u) over the unobserved vari-
ables, together with the functions onto the endoge-
nous variables, deﬁne an observed distribution P(v).
Exogenous and endogenous variables together can be
thought of as drawn from a joint distribution P(u,v).
When we mention models or causal models in this pa-
per, we will be referring to structural causal models.
Each causal model induces a causal diagram, as fol-
lows. Each variable in the model is represented by
a vertex, and a vertex corresponding to a variable Vi
has arrows incoming from every variable whose value
is used to determine the value of Vi by its determining
function. In such a graph exogenous variables have
no incoming arrows. In this paper we will restrict our
attention to acyclic causal diagrams.
We will also use standard graph-theoretic terminology.A path is a sequence of edges where each pair of ad-
jacent edges in the sequence share a node, and each
such shared node can only occur once in the path. A
path from a node X to a node Y consists exclusively
of directed arrows pointing away from X is called di-
rected or causal, all other kinds of paths are called
non-causal. An ancestor of X is any node which has
a directed path to X (including X itself). A descen-
dant of X is any node which X has a directed path to
(including X itself). The ancestor set of a node set X
is all ancestors of any node in X. The descendant set
of a node set X is all descendants of any node in X.
We will abbreviate ancestor and descendant sets of X
in G as An(X)G and De(X)G.
One of the advantages of the causal diagram repre-
sentation is its ability to display conditional indepen-
dence among variables in terms of a path separation
criterion known as d-separation [6]. Two sets of nodes
X,Y are said to be d-separated by a third set Z if ev-
ery path from any node X ∈ X to any node Y ∈ Y is
“blocked”. A path is “blocked” if it contains a triple
of consecutive nodes connected in one of the follow-
ing three ways: Wi → Wj → Wk, Wi ← Wj → Wk,
and Wi → Wl ← Wk, where Wj ∈ Z, and neither
Wl nor any descendant of Wl is in Z. Paths (or node
sets) that are not d-separated are called d-connected,
active, or open. A path starting with an outgoing ar-
row is called a front-door path, while a d-connected
path starting with an incoming arrow is called a back-
door path. The relationship between d-separation and
conditional independence is provided by the following
well-known theorem [6].
Theorem 1 (Pearl) Let G be a causal diagram.
Then in any model M with a distribution P(u,v) in-
ducing G, if X is d-separated from Y by Z in G, then
X is independent of Y given Z in P(u,v).
Following [3], we will denote conditional independence
statements like the one in the theorem by (X ⊥ ⊥ Y|Z).
A graph G which represents independences of P(v) in
M via d-separation is called an I-map of P(v) [6].
If many of the variables in a causal diagram are latent,
it can be inconvenient to consider long path stretches
containing nothing but latent variables. One graph-
ical representation that avoids this is the latent pro-
jection [19]. A latent projection of a causal diagram
is a mixed graph containing directed and bidirected
arcs, where there is a vertex for every observable node,
and two observable nodes X,Y are connected by a di-
rected arrow if there is a d-connected path from X to
Y in the original causal diagram containing only ar-
rows pointing away from X and towards Y , and each
node on this path other than X and Y is latent. Sim-
ilarly, X and Y are connected by a bidirected arrow if
there is a d-connected path from X to Y in the origi-
nal causal diagram which starts with an arrow point-
ing to X and ends in an arrow pointing to Y , where
each node on this path other than X and Y is latent.
D-separation generalizes in a straightforward way to
latent projections [9], and latent projections preserve
all d-separation statements of the original causal dia-
grams. In the remainder of the paper we will assume
all graphs are latent projections.
Consider graphs, shown in Fig. 1 (a), (b) representing
the eﬀect of a drug (X) on an outcome (Y ), in the pres-
ence of a chronic exposure (Z), say long term alcohol
abuse. We assume the temporal order of chronic ex-
posure and drug exposure is not known. If the chronic
exposure precedes the drug, as in Fig. 1 (a), it af-
fects both the drug reaction (via liver damage) and
the outcome. If the chronic exposure follows the drug,
as in Fig. 1 (b), it does not aﬀect the outcome, since
the outcome is measured soon after drug exposure
(not giving liver damage from alcohol time to accu-
mulate). These two models disagree on observational
claims which means they can be tested (for instance by
checking if Z is independent of Y given X). However,
assume further that we lack the power to distinguish
these models, yet wish to make inferences about the
causal eﬀect of X on Y .
We can analyze this problem using the do(x) notation,
introduced by Pearl [8] (and equivalent to g(x) nota-
tion in [10]). In this notation, do(x) stands for an ide-
alized experiment, or intervention, where the values of
X are set to x, regardless of the normal causal mecha-
nisms which determine the values of X. Pearl formal-
ized the causal eﬀect of X on Y as the distribution of
Y after the do(x) operation, written P(y|do(x)). In
general, P(y|do(x)) is diﬀerent from the conditional
distribution of Y given X, or P(y|x), since X may be
related to Y both via causal action and via certain
variables which aﬀect both X and Y. In identifying
P(y|do(x)) we are interested only in eﬀects of X on Y
along causal paths.
A classic problem in causal inference is identifying
P(y|do(x)) from observational data, since implement-
ing idealized experiments in practice is diﬃcult. A
well-known way of identifying P(y|do(x)) in situations
where Y and X share common causes is performing
covariate adjustment, in other words ﬁnding a set of
variables Z such that P(y|do(x)) =
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z).
Pearl developed the well-known back-door criterion
[7], [8], which gave graphical conditions for when the
above adjustment formula yields valid functionals for
P(y|do(x)), where Y,X are variable sets.
Deﬁnition 1 (back-door criterion) Let X,Y be
disjoint sets of nodes in a graph G. Then a set Zx y
z
x y
z
z
x u
y
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Figure 1: (a),(b) Causal diagrams where the eﬀect
P(y|do(x)) can be identiﬁed via
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z). (c)
A causal diagram G where P(y|do(x)) is not identiﬁ-
able via adjustment for any set.
satisﬁes the back-door criterion relative to (X,Y) if
• No element in Z is a descendant of X
• Z d-separates all back-door path from X to Y
Theorem 2 (Pearl) If some set Z satisﬁes the back-
door criterion relative to (X,Y) in the graph G, then
P(y|do(x)) =
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z) in every model which
induces G.
The back-door criterion allows us to conclude that
P(y|do(x)) =
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z) in Fig. 1 (a). The
back-door criterion, however, is not complete. In par-
ticular, P(y|do(x)) =
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z) in Fig. 1 (b),
though Z does not satisfy the back-door criterion with
respect to (X,Y ).
In fact, the process of adjustment itself is not com-
plete in that there are certain graphs where a causal
eﬀect P(y|do(x)) is identiﬁable, but there is no Z
for which
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z) is a valid functional for
P(y|do(x)). This is true of a graph shown in Fig.
1 (c), where we are interested in P(y|do(x)) and U
is unobserved (which means we cannot adjust for
it). In fact, the valid functional for this causal eﬀect
is
P
z P(z|x)
P
x′ P(y|z,x′)P(x′), which is obtained
from the front-door criterion [8].
In general, there are complete algorithms which, given
a graph and a causal eﬀect of interest, produce a func-
tional for the causal eﬀect valid given the causal as-
sumptions embodied by the graph [18], [13],[12]. By
complete, we mean that any time the algorithm fails,
there is no valid functional for the eﬀect of interest
in all models with the given graph, and thus no other
algorithm could produce such a functional. Despite
these results, in practical causal inference problems
identiﬁcation is generally done via covariate adjust-
ment. This is because in practice it is very diﬃcult
to determine precise causal relationships between vari-
ables to produce a graph, while it is much easier to talk
about “coarser” causal notions such as pre-treatment
covariates and confounding.
For this reason, we concentrate on covariate adjust-
ment in this paper. After introducing relevant ter-
minology in subsequent sections, we will develop a
criterion which will precisely characterize when co-
variate adjustment for Z yields correct functionals for
P(y|do(x)) in G.
3 Graphs and Counterfactuals
In this section, we will introduce counterfactual distri-
butions, which generalize causal eﬀects, and counter-
factual graphs, which display independences in coun-
terfactual distributions.
As mentioned in the previous section, the responses
of the remaining observable variables other than X to
the intervention are represented by an interventional
distribution denoted as P(v\x|do(x)) or Px(v\x). The
response of a single observable variable Y to do(x) is
sometimes denoted with a counterfactual variable Yx.
Similarly, the response of a set Y = {Y 1,Y 2,...,Y k}
to do(x) will be denoted by Yx.
The do(x) operation in a graph G can be represented
graphically by removing all arrows pointing to nodes
in X. This is because ordinarily, values of X are de-
termined by direct causal inﬂuences stemming from
its parent variables in the graph, and these same in-
ﬂuences are ignored by the do(x) operation. We will
denote the resulting graph, which is sometimes called
the mutilated graph, as Gx.
Once we ﬁx the value of every exogenous variable in
the model, the remaining variables become determin-
istically ﬁxed. This allows us to use the distribution
P over exogenous variables to deﬁne joint distribu-
tions over counterfactual variables, even if the inter-
ventions which determine these variables disagree with
each other. Such a joint distribution is deﬁned as fol-
lows:
P(Y 1
x1 = y1,...,Y k
xk = yk) =
X
{u|Y 1
x1(u)=y1∧...∧Y k
xk(u)=yk}
P(u)
where U is the set of exogenous variables in the model.
Independence among counterfactual variables can be
displayed by a special graph, called the counterfac-
tual graph [15], [14], just as independence between
causal variables is displayed by a causal diagram via
d-separation. The construction of the counterfactual
graph is rather intricate, however for the purposes of
this paper it is suﬃcient to consider a simpliﬁed ver-
sion known as the twin network graph [2], [1].
The twin network graph displays counterfactual in-
dependence among two possible worlds, the pre-x z
y
x
y u
Figure 2: The twin network graph for do(x) in the
graph in Fig. 1 (a).
intervention world which is represented by the origi-
nal graph G, and the post-intervention world, which is
represented by the graph Gx. In other words, the twin
network graph is an I-map for the joint counterfactual
distribution P(v,vx), where V is the set of all ob-
servable variables, and Vx is the set of all observable
variable after the intervention do(x) was performed.
The observable nodes in these two graphs share the U
variables, to signify common history of these worlds up
to the point divergence due to do(x). We will add an
additional reﬁnement, appearing in [15], where node
copies of all non-descendants of X in G are merged
in the twin network graph (since such nodes are the
same random variable in either intervened or natural
world). Fig. 2 shows the twin network graph for do(x)
in the graph shown in Fig. 1 (a) (note that Z is shared
across both worlds).
We are introducing the mathematics of counterfactu-
als in this paper because, in the course of proving the
soundness of our criterion for Z serving as a valid ad-
justment set for treatments X and outcomes Y, we
will show that if the criterion is used in structural
causal models, it will imply that (Yx ⊥ ⊥ X|Z), in
other words the post intervention outcomes are inde-
pendent of treatments conditioned on the covariates.
This assumption is sometimes known as conditional
ignorability [11], and is often assumed in practice as
a prelude for using adjustment functionals to identify
causal eﬀects. This implication will show that condi-
tional ignorability is the logically minimal assumption
which permits adjustment in structural causal mod-
els, in other words if it’s true, adjustment is valid, and
valid adjustment implies its truth.
4 The Adjustment Criterion
Before we can give a complete graphical criterion, we
need to introduce some helpful terminology.
Deﬁnition 2 (collider) A three-node path (X,Y,Z)
from X to Z is called a collider if the edges connecting
X to Y and Y to Z have arrowheads pointing to Y .
Deﬁnition 3 (inducing path) A path π from node
set X to node set Y in a causal graph G is called in-
ducing if:
• Every three-node path segment of π is a collider
• Every node on the path is ancestral to X or Y
Deﬁnition 4 (proper causal path) Let X,Y be
sets of nodes. A causal path from a node in X to a
node in Y is called proper if it does not intersect X
except at the end point.
A complete adjustment criterion would, for any eﬀect
P(y|do(x)), allow any adjustment set Z which opens
all proper causal paths, but blocks “everything else.”
Deﬁnition 5 (adjustment criterion) Z satisﬁes
the adjustment criterion relative to (X,Y) in G if
• No element in Z is a descendant in Gx of any
W  ∈ X which lies on a proper causal path from
X to Y.
• All non-causal paths in G from X to Y are blocked
by Z.
It’s fairly clear from the deﬁnition that this criterion
generalizes the back-door criterion. In particular, note
that while all back-door paths are non-causal, not all
non-causal paths are back-door. For example, in the
Fig. 1 (c), there is one causal path from X to Z,
namely X → Z, and one non-causal path from Z to X,
namely Z → Y ← U → X. This path is not back-door
with respect to Z since the edge closest to Z points
away from Z. In Fig. 1 (b), Z satisﬁes the adjustment
criterion with respect to (X,Y ), yet does not satisfy
the back-door criterion with respect to (X,Y ) (since
Z is a descendant of X).
Lemma 1 If Z satisﬁes the back-door criterion with
respect to (X,Y) in G, then Z satisﬁes the adjustment
criterion with respect to (X,Y) in G.
Proof: This follows by above deﬁnition and deﬁnition
of d-separation. ¤
In the next section, we show that not only does the
adjustment criterion always yield valid functionals for
the causal eﬀect, but whenever it fails on some covari-
ate set in a graph, there is some model which induces
that graph where adjustment by the covariate set will
not yield the correct causal eﬀect expression.
5 Soundness and Completeness
We ﬁrst prove the completeness direction.Theorem 3 Assume the adjustment criterion fails to
hold for Z with respect to (X,Y) in G. Then there
exists a model inducing G such that P(y|do(x))  = P
z P(y|x,z)P(z).
Proof: We have two cases to consider. Either Z con-
tains a descendant of a node on a proper causal path
from X to Y, and its closest ancestor on this causal
path is not in X, or no element of Z is a descendant of
a node on a proper causal path from X ∈ X to Y ∈ Y
such that its closest ancestor on this causal path is not
X, but Z opens a non-causal path from X to Y.
For the ﬁrst case, ﬁx a graph containing only the
proper causal path from X ∈ X to Y ∈ Y with
appropriate segment connecting this path to Z ∈ Z.
See Fig. 3 for an example. Without loss of general-
ity we can assume a single Y in this graph. We get
P(y|do(x)) = P(y|x).
It’s not diﬃcult to ﬁnd a model with this graph
where
P
z P(y|z,x)P(z) to not equal P(y|x). For in-
stance let the node on the path from X to Y that
is the closest to Z be denoted W. If W = Z,
then P(y|z,x) = P(y|z), so
P
z P(y|z,x)P(z) =
P(y), which is easy to arrange to not equal P(y|x).
Otherwise, P(y|x) =
P
w P(y|w)P(w|x), while P
z P(y|x,z)P(z) =
P
z,w P(y,x,z,w)/P(x|z) = P
w P(y|w)
P
z P(w|x,z)P(z).
We can view
P
w P(y|w) as an operator which maps
probability distributions over W onto probability dis-
tributions over Y . It is not diﬃcult to arrange P(y|w)
in such a way that this map is one-to-one. Then all
we have to show is that P(w|x) =
P
z P(w|x,z)P(z|x)
need not equal
P
z P(w|x,z)P(z) in every model. But
this is also not hard to show – let
P
z P(w|x,z) be
one-to-one and make sure P(z|x) is not equal to P(z).
For the second case, assume Z opens a non-causal path
π from X ∈ X to Y ∈ Y. Consider the subgraph G′ of
G containing all nodes in π, along with a path for every
open collider in π, witnessing this collider as ancestral
of Z. Since the ﬁrst case does not hold, this subgraph
cannot contain nodes on any proper causal path from
X to Y (otherwise, either π contains a proper causal
path as a subpath, or Z contains descendants of nodes
on the proper causal path and the closest ancestor on
the proper causal path is not X). See Fig. 4 for an
example. Thus, in G′, P(y|do(x)) = P(y). Let the
subset of Z intersecting G′ be denoted Z’.
It is a simple matter to pick the behavior of the
variables on the open path from X to Y such that
P(y|x,z′) is not equal to P(y|z′), and the map-
pings
P
z′ P(y|x,z′) and
P
z′ P(y|z′) do not map a
given P(z) to the same output. This implies that P
z′ P(y|x,z′)P(z′) is not equal to P(y) in the model.
x ... w ... y
... z
Figure 3: Case 1 of theorem 3.
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Figure 4: Case 2 of theorem 3.
So far, we have shown that if the adjustment criterion
for Z with respect to (X,Y) is violated in G, we can
ﬁnd a path from X ∈ X to Y ∈ Y such that there is
a model inducing a subgraph G′ associated with this
path where the causal eﬀect P(y|do(x)) is not equal
to the adjustment functional
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z). But
to prove the general completeness statement, we need
only ﬁnd any model where adjustment fails to equal to
the causal eﬀect expression. In particular, we are free
to pick models not faithful [17] to G. In fact, assume
all nodes in G outside of G′ are mutually independent.
Then for case one, we have the following identities: P
z P(y|x,z)P(z) =
P
z P(y|z,x)P(z)P(y\{y}), and
P(y|do(x)) = P(y|x)P(y \ {y}). For case two, we
have:
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z) =
P
z′ P(y|x,z′)P(z′)P(y \
{y}), and P(y|do(x)) = P(y)P(y \ {y}). Our result
then follows for both cases in such a model. ¤
Before showing soundness, we give some deﬁnitions
and utility lemmas.
A path is a sequence of edges where each pair of ad-
jacent edges in the sequence share a node, and each
such shared node can only occur once in the path.
Deﬁnition 6 (route) A route from X to Y in a
graph G is a sequence of edges in G, where each pair
of adjacent edges share a node, the unshared node of
the ﬁrst edge is X, and the unshared node of the last
edge is Y .
Note: shared nodes can occur more than once.
A route is d-separated if the same triples are blocked
as in the deﬁnition of d-separated paths on p. 2. The
diﬀerence between a route and a path is that path se-
quences cannot contain duplicate nodes while route
sequences can.
Deﬁnition 7 (direct route) Let π be a route from
X to Y in G. Label each node occurrence in the routeπ by the number of times the node has already occurred
earlier in π (so the ﬁrst occurrence is labeled 0, the
second is labeled 1, etc.)
A direct route π∗ is a subsequence obtained from π
inductively as follows:
• First node in π∗ is the ﬁrst node in π with the
largest occurrence number.
• If the kth shared node in π∗ (and mth node in π)
is (Xi,r), and Xi  = Y , let the k +1th node in π∗
be (Xj,n), where Xj is the m+1th node in π, and
n is the largest occurrence number of Xj in π.
Lemma 2 For every route π in G, the direct route π∗
is a path. Moreover, if π is d-connected, then π∗ is
d-connected.
Proof: That the direct route is a route follows from the
previous deﬁnition – direct routes have node neighbors
only if those nodes were neighbors in the original route,
and those nodes are neighbors in G. The direct route
is a path since the deﬁnition only takes nodes in the
original sequence with the largest occurrence numbers.
To show the second part, we must show all three-node
sequences in π∗ are open. Consider all elements of Z
on the route π. Since π is open, all edges connecting
nodes in π neighboring these elements in Z must point
to them. Since every edge in π∗ is inherited from π,
this implies that if Z is a part of π∗, it must be in the
middle of a collider.
What remains to show is that a collider in π∗ which
does not have an element of Z as a middle node, must
contain such a node as a descendant. Consider the two
edges e1,e2 making up such a collider in the original
route π. If these edges are adjacent in π, we are done,
since π is active. Otherwise, let e3 be an edge following
e1 in π, and ee an edge preceding e2 in π. If either e1,e3
or e4,e2 form a collider we are also done. Otherwise,
either e3 or e4 must point to an ancestor of Z, if π is
active. ¤
We are now ready to show soundness.
Theorem 4 Assume the adjustment criterion holds
for Z and (X,Y) in G. Then for every model inducing
G, (Yx ⊥ ⊥ X|Z).
Proof: Assume the adjustment criterion holds in G.
Consider the twin network graph G∗ showing the pre-
intervention world, and the world after do(x). We
want to show that if Z satisﬁes the adjustment cri-
terion for (X,Y) in G, then X is d-separated from Yx
by Z in the twin network graph. We will show the
contrapositive, namely that an active path from X to
Yx in G∗ implies the criterion is violated.
Fix an active path π from X to Yx in G∗. Without loss
of generality, assume π intersects X only once at the
endpoint. Since we are conditioning on variables Z in
the pre-intervention world, no descendant of X in the
post-intervention world is conditioned on. Thus, any
active path π from X to Yx that “lands” in the post-
intervention world must descend, via arrows pointing
to Yx, to Yx.
By above, an active path π from X to Yx in G∗ consists
of three parts, π1,π2,π3, where π1 is just some active
path in the original graph G, π3 is a directed path in
Gx where every node in π3 is a descendant of X, and
π2 is a single edge connecting these paths in G∗ to
form π.
Note that G∗ contains copies of nodes in G, with
one copy corresponding to the variable in the original
world, and another copy corresponding to the variable
in the post-intervention world. Thus, even though π
is a path in G∗, π may contain counterfactual nodes
(say Wx and W), which refer to the same node in
G. Let π′ be a sequence of node/occurrence number
pairs in G obtained from π by the following two steps.
The ﬁrst step replaces all occurrences of counterfac-
tual variables in π by the nodes in G these variables
were derived from, coupled with appropriate occur-
rence numbers. The second step replaces all occur-
rences of a single variable twice in a row in the se-
quence obtained from step one by a single occurrence
of that node (with occurrence numbers of this node
and all subsequent occurrences appropriately decre-
mented). It’s not diﬃcult to see that π′ is a route
in G. Let π∗ be the direct route of π′.
Note that the sections of π′ corresponding to sections
π1 and π3 in π must be active. The remaining section
in π′ is a node triple containing a middle node whose
copy was pointed to by π2 in π. If this node triple
exists in π, it must also be active in π′. Otherwise, it
was obtained from four consecutive nodes in π, with
two middle ones being node copies connected by π2.
These middle nodes cannot intersect or be ancestral of
Z (or the adjustment criterion is violated). Otherwise,
the triple in π′ must look like ◦ ← ◦ → ◦, which implies
it’s active. Thus, π′ is an active route.
By Lemma 2, π∗ is an active path. If π∗ is non-causal,
we are done, as this means there is an active non-causal
path connecting Y and X given Z, which contradicts
the adjustment criterion. If π∗ is causal, we can as-
sume without loss of generality it is also proper causal.
We now have two cases: either π2 is bidirected or di-
rected. Since π∗ is causal, the ﬁrst edge in π must be
an arrow leading away from an element in X. But if
π2 is bidirected, then the only way π could be active
in G∗ is if the second node in π is an ancestor of Z.But by construction of π∗, the second node in π is also
the second node in π∗ (although perhaps with a dif-
ferent occurrence number). But this contradicts the
adjustment criterion.
If the π2 edge is a directed arc, then the nodes it con-
nects are a parent/child pair in G, with the parent copy
(say of node M) in the G part of G∗, and the child copy
(say of node N) in the Gx part of G∗. Then M cannot
have X ancestors, otherwise it would not be in the G
section of G∗. If π1 and π3 do not share nodes, then
π∗ cannot be a proper causal path from X to Y since
otherwise every node in π∗, including M, must be a
descendant of X, which is a contradiction.
If π1 and π3 share nodes, then the only way to reach M
from X with an active path that starts with an arrow
pointing away from X is via a collider open by Z. But
this implies the second node in π (and thus the second
node in π∗) is an ancestor of Z, which contradicts the
adjustment criterion. ¤
Corollary 1 Assume the adjustment criterion holds
for Z and (X,Y) in G. Then for every model inducing
G,
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z).
Proof: The assumption implies (Yx ⊥ ⊥ X|Z) in ev-
ery model inducing G, by Theorem 4. By laws of
probability, P(Yx) =
P
z P(Yx|z)P(z). The axiom
of consistency (called composition in [8], chapter 7)
then implies the conclusion. ¤
6 Corollaries
We now derive some interesting corollaries of the com-
pleteness of the adjustment criterion. First, we show
the logical minimality of the conditional ignorability
assumption for covariate adjustment.
Corollary 2 P(y|do(x)) =
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z) in ev-
ery model inducing G, if and only if (Yx ⊥ ⊥ X|Z)
holds in every model inducing G,
Proof: If (Yx ⊥ ⊥ X|Z) holds in every model, the ad-
justment formula is valid by proof of Corollary 1. If
the adjustment formula is valid for every model in-
ducing G, then the adjustment criterion holds in G
by Theorem 3, and the adjustment formula holds for
every model inducing G by Corollary 1. ¤
This corollary is useful in practical causal inference sit-
uations where we are unwilling to commit to a partic-
ular causal diagram due to lack of domain knowledge,
yet feel conﬁdent in making limited counterfactual in-
dependence assumptions. This corollary states that if
we want to identify eﬀects via covariate adjustment in
such situations, we might as well assume conditional
ignorability, since any other assumption we may use
that permits adjustment will imply it.
Next, we consider the problem of what adjustment sets
are suﬃcient for an unbiased estimate of causal eﬀect,
given that we know that a valid adjustment set exists.
We give some utility lemmas ﬁrst.
Lemma 3 A node set X cannot be d-separated from a
node set Y in G if and only if there exists an inducing
path from X to Y in G.
Proof: See proof of Theorem 10 in [16]. ¤
Lemma 4 If X and Y are not connected by an induc-
ing path in G then A = An(X ∪ Y) \ (X ∪ Y) is a set
suﬃcient for d-separating X and Y.
Proof: Any path from X to Y which involves any
nodes not in A must contain a collider and so isn’t
d-connecting. Consider a path from X to Y consist-
ing entirely of nodes in A (we can assume the path
only intersects X and Y at the endpoints). Since we
condition on A, the d-connecting path must contain
only colliders, but this implies there is a path consist-
ing entirely of colliders all of which are ancestral of
X or Y. This contradicts the absence of an inducing
path. ¤
Lemma 5 Let G be a graph, P(y|do(x)) a causal ef-
fect. Let M be the set of nodes on the proper causal
paths from X to Y. Let G∗ be the latent projection
obtained from G by marginalizing out M.
Then Z satisﬁes the adjustment criterion with respect
to (X,Y) in G if and only if Z also satisﬁes the ad-
justment criterion with respect to (X,Y) in G∗.
Proof: Note that Z cannot intersect M or the adjust-
ment criterion is violated. Since marginalization does
not aﬀect d-separation statements, the second part
of the criterion is preserved. Similarly, marginaliza-
tion does not create new ancestor/descendant relations
that were not present before marginalization. Thus the
ﬁrst part of the criterion is preserved as well. ¤
The following result suggests that the back-door cri-
terion, despite being incomplete, does capture the in-
tuition behind valid adjustment in some sense, since
whenever a valid adjustment set exists for a causal ef-
fect, the subset of this adjustment set which forms the
non-descendants of treatment variables is also a valid
adjustment set.
Theorem 5 Fix sets X,Y in G such that
P(y|do(x)) =
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z) for some set Z in
every causal model inducing G. Let Z
∗ = Z \ De(X).
Then Z
∗ satisﬁes the back-door criterion with respect
to (X,Y).Proof: Consider some d-connected path π from X to
Y, given Z
∗. If π starts with an arrow pointing away
from X then, since Z
∗ contains no descendants of X, π
is either proper causal to Y, or non-causal and blocked.
If π starts with an arrow pointing towards X, it is
a back-door path. Since Z
∗ contains no descendants
of X, and Z
∗ is the only set we are conditioning on,
once π reaches a node W which is a descendant of X,
in order for it to stay active, it must descend along
directed arrows away from W to Y. But no element
of Z \ Z
∗ can block the portion of π from W to Y
because that portion of the path is on a proper causal
path from X to Y (since W is a descendant of X).
Thus π must have been active conditioned on Z. But
by assumption Z satisﬁes the adjustment criterion for
(X,Y), and we have a contradiction. ¤
Theorem 6 Let G be a graph, and P(y|do(x)) a
causal eﬀect. Assume a set of nodes Z exists such
that P(y|do(x)) =
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z) in every model
inducing G. Let M be the set of nodes which lie on
some proper causal path from X to Y in G. Then
P(y|do(x)) =
P
a P(y|x,a)P(a) in every model induc-
ing G, where A = An(X ∪ Y) \ (X ∪ Y ∪ M).
Proof: By Theorem 3, Z satisﬁes the adjustment crite-
rion with respect to (X,Y) in G. Let G∗ be the graph
obtained from G by marginalizing out M. By Lemma
5, Z still satisﬁes the adjustment criterion with respect
to (X,Y) in G∗. By Theorem 5, Z
∗ = Z\De(X) sat-
isﬁes the back-door criterion with respect to (X,Y).
Let G∗
x be the graph obtained from G∗ by cutting all
outgoing directed arrows from X. By construction, Z
d-separates X and Y in G∗
x. This implies by Lemma
3 that X and Y have no inducing path in G∗
x. This,
in turn, implies An(X ∪ Y) \ (X ∪ Y) must also d-
separate X from Y in G∗
x, by Lemma 4. But this set
is precisely equal to A, and by construction of G∗
x, it’s
clear A satisﬁes the back-door criterion with respect
to (X,Y) in G∗. Finally, Lemmas 1 and 5 tell us
A satisﬁes the adjustment criterion with respect to
(X,Y) in G. This proves our result. ¤
Theorem 6 says that if we know that a valid adjust-
ment set exists, we are free to adjust for all ancestors
of treatment and outcome, as long as those ancestors
do not occupy proper causal paths we are interested
in. Adjusting for all observable causal ancestors A can
be statistically desirable when constructing estimators
for causal eﬀects P(y|do(x)), since such a set often in-
cludes many independent causes of outcome nodes Y,
and including such nodes in the adjustment set can
improve the eﬃciency of the estimator. Furthermore,
Theorem 6 can be useful in practical causal inference
problems, where it is often assumed that a valid co-
variate set exists, and it is known which covariates are
ancestral of treatments and outcomes, while the exact
causal relationships between covariates themselves are
not known.
7 A Non-counterfactual Soundness
Proof
In the previous section, we assumed structural causal
models, which imply counterfactual quantities, and
we heavily used these quantities in our proofs. This
allowed us to derive logical minimality of the con-
ditional ignorability assumption for covariate adjust-
ment (Corollary 2). Nevertheless, the use of counter-
factuals has come under some criticism in the litera-
ture [4], due to their untestability. There exist alterna-
tive formulations of causal models [8], [17], [4] which
either do not make use of counterfactuals at all. It
is therefore of interest to examine whether our results
are applicable to such models without making use of
counterfactuals. This should be possible since sound-
ness and completeness of the adjustment criterion are
facts about interventional and observational distribu-
tions, not speciﬁcally about counterfactuals.
In this section, we give such an alternative proof.
Deﬁnition 8 (magniﬁcation) Let G be a causal di-
agram, let E = {e1,...,ek} be a set of edges in G. Let
Ge be a directed acyclic graph constructed as follows.
Ge contains every observable node in G, a new observ-
able node We for every bidirected arc e, and possibly a
new observable node Ci for every directed arc ei ∈ E.
Moreover, in Ge, if an edge is not in E, it exists in
Ge. For every bidirected arc e in G connecting X and
Y , there is a directed edge in Ge from We to both X
and Y , and for every ei ∈ E, connecting X and Y in
G, there is a directed arc in Ge from X to Ci and from
Ci to Y .
Then Ge is the magniﬁcation of G with respect to E.
A magniﬁcation of a graph is a new graph where we
“unmarginalize” all unobserved variables, and more-
over introduce a new mediator for every previously
direct causal arrow from X to Y in E. We call this
graph a magniﬁcation because by using this new graph
we are increasing the granularity at which we are look-
ing at our causal model represented by G.
Theorem 7 Let G be a causal diagram, and
P(y|do(x)) a causal eﬀect of interest, and Z a set par-
titioned into non-descendants of X (Znd), and descen-
dants of X (Zd). Let E be the set of all directed edges
pointing away from Y. Let Ge be the magniﬁcation
of G with respect to E. Assume there exists a set of
nodes L such that(a) L∪Znd satisfy the back-door criterion with respect
to (X,Y)
(b) (X ⊥ ⊥ L|Z)
(c) (Y ⊥ ⊥ Zd|X,Znd,L)
where statements using the ⊥ ⊥ symbol in (b) and (c)
are to be interpreted as d-separation statements in Ge.
Then P(y|do(x)) =
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z) in any causal
model M inducing G.
Proof: Fix some model Me which induces Ge which
recovers the marginal P(v) of M when marginal-
izing over all newly introduced nodes in Ge over
G. In this model, we have: P(y|do(x)) = P
l,znd P(y|x,l,znd)P(l,znd), by (a). P(y|do(x)) = P
l,z P(y|x,l,z)P(l,z), by (c). Finally, P(y|do(x)) = P
l,z P(y|x,l,z)P(l|z,x)P(z) =
P
z P(y|x,z)P(z), by
(b). Since adjustment holds in Me, and only makes
use of variables in M, adjustment also holds in M. ¤
What we will show next is the adjustment criterion in
G implies we can always ﬁnd such an L in Ge. This
means that if we cannot ﬁnd such an L, the adjustment
criterion fails in G, and it’s completeness (the proof
of which did not use counterfactuals) will imply the
completeness of this alternative criterion. We prove
the implication without using counterfactuals.
Theorem 8 Assume the adjustment criterion holds
for Z with respect to (X,Y) in G. Then we can ﬁnd
L satisfying the properties in Theorem 7 in Ge.
Proof: Let L be the intersection of the following three
sets: ancestors of Z in Ge, non-descendants of X in Ge,
and nodes d-connected to Y given Z in the graph Ge\
X where X and all edges pointing to X are removed.
We will show this set satisﬁes (a), (b) and (c).
(a) implies that L ∪ Znd consists of non-descendants
of X only. This is true by deﬁnition for both sets. (a)
also implies that L ∪ Znd block all back-door paths
from X to Y. Assume this isn’t true, and ﬁx an open
back-door path from X to Y given L,Znd. We know
from Theorem 5 that Znd is back-door for (X,Y). That
means Znd by itself blocks this path, and L is what
opens it. So the only way nodes in L are involved in the
back-door path are by being descendants of colliders on
this path. L is an ancestor of either Z not through X,
or of X. In the former case, Z opens the collider on the
path. In the latter case, we restart the argument with
a back-door path from X ∈ X between L and Z. If
all colliders are thus open, we get a contradiction since
we assumed all non-causal paths, and in particular all
back-door paths from X to Y are blocked by Z.
Assume (b) isn’t true. Then there is an open path
from X to L that is either causal, or non-causal. Since
L is not a descendant of X, this path is not causal.
Otherwise, there is a non-causal path from X to L ∈ L
(given Z), and an open path from L ∈ L to Y (given
Z). Adjoining these two d-connected paths creates a
d-connected route π from X to Y. The direct route
π∗ of π is then a d-connected path given Z from X to
Y by Lemma 2. Moreover, since the path from L to
Y is in G \ X, the direct route is non-causal, and we
have a contradiction.
Assume (c) isn’t true. Then there is an open path
from Zd to Y that is either causal or non-causal. If
it’s causal, then the adjustment criterion is violated,
since Zd will block a proper causal path from X to Y.
If the path π from Zd to Y is non-causal, then it’s most
general form is: Zdo → Z1 ← ... → Zk ← oY . Here
circles at the edge ends of the ﬁrst and last edge of the
path mean that end of edge can be either an arrow or
a tail, and elements Z1,...Zk are in X ∪ Znd ∪ L.
Consider the Zi ∈ X closest (on π) to Y among all
Zi which belong to X. Then we restart our argument
considering a back-door path from this Zi to Y . Thus
we can assume Z1,...,Zk does not intersect X. Sim-
ilarly, if Zi ∈ L, Zi must be ancestral of Z. If it’s
only ancestral via an element in X, we consider the Zi
closest to Y along π with this property, and conclude
there is a non-causal path from that X to Y that’s
open given Z. This contradicts the adjustment crite-
rion we assumed. If Zi is ancestral of Z not via X,
then if this Z is in Zd, we repeat the argument with
this Zd being the new endpoint of a non-causal path
to Y . Otherwise, Z is in Znd. Thus, without loss of
generality assume all Z1,...,Zk are in Znd.
We have two cases, the path ends in → Y , or ← Y . In
the former case, if the highest point on the Zk ← ... →
Y segment is a descendant of X, then Zk cannot be in
Znd as was our assumption. If the highest point is not
a descendant of X, it is in L by deﬁnition (since it is
d-connected to Y given Z in G\X, is an ancestor of Z,
and not a descendant of X), and so is conditioned on
and blocks this path. If the path ends in ← Y , then if
this Y is a descendant of X, the adjustment criterion
is violated since this Y must be an ancestor of Z. If Y
is not a descendant of X, then it’s mediator variable
we added to Ge which connects Y to its second node
on the path cannot be a descendant of X either, and
so is in L and blocks the path. ¤
8 Discussion
We have given a complete criterion for covariate ad-
justment in structural causal models. This criterion
generalizes the well-known back-door criterion [7], tocertain cases where its permissible to adjust for de-
scendants of treatment variables. Our criterion implies
that whenever we adjust using a (valid) covariate set
which includes descendants of the treatment variable,
it is possible to remove these descendants from the co-
variate set, without aﬀecting validity of adjustment.
Additionally, we show that the existence of a valid
adjustment set of any kind implies adjusting for all
ancestors of treatment and outcome that do not lie on
causal paths of interest is suﬃcient to give a valid es-
timate of the causal eﬀect. We give both a counterfac-
tual proof of our result, which implies the logical min-
imality of the conditional ignorability assumption for
covariate adjustment, and a non-counterfactual proof
which holds in models which remain agnostic about
counterfactual statements.
We believe characterizing covariate adjustment is im-
portant because, despite the fact that more sophisti-
cated identiﬁcation methods exist [18], [12], the vast
majority of causal eﬀect identiﬁcation in practice is
done via covariate adjustment.
Our result allows the use of covariate adjustment even
if the model is partially unspeciﬁed or misspeciﬁed,
in other words if the direction of some arrows in the
causal diagram is unknown or incorrect. Going back
to our example in Fig. 1, our results allow us to use
the adjustment formula safely, even if we are not sure
whether the graph in Fig. 1 (a) or the graph in Fig. 1
(b) is the correct model, and lack the statistical power
to distinguish these cases.
Finally, since our result can be used to list all possible
valid covariate sets for a given causal eﬀect, it paves
the way for considering which set yields the most sta-
tistically desirable estimator of a causal eﬀect, for in-
stance in terms of eﬃciency, or mean squared error.
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